So I’m discussing Bush, Kerry, and Iraq on some inconsequential BBS. And I’m subjected to the typical liberal idiotarian arguments about no WMD, yadda-yadda, Chalabi. yadda-yadda, Haliburton, yadda-yadda, ad nauseam. So, after discrediting about the 50th cited article from the likes of Al Jazeera, and the World Socialist Website, I respond with the following:

Basically, what you guys are saying is that, because there is some evidence that your preferred conclusion is true, than it is true without question. That is a logical fallacy.

Yes, there have been substantial miscalculations in the past, and there will be more in the future. But, as Sun Tzu teaches us, “no plan, no matter how cleverly conceived, survives its first contact with reality.” When John Kerry says he has a “Four Year Plan” to get us out of Iraq, the wisdom of the ages tells us he’s trying to sell us a bill of goods. Any actions we take will be contingent upon the actions of the Iraqi civil authorities, which aren’t even in place yet. So any talk of grand “plans” is utter nonsense.

Yes, there are negative trends in some metrics. The most notable would be the increase in terrorist aggression, and the resultant losses. And I do not argue that is an entirely unsatisfactory situation. However, from the standpoint of the objective military strategist: The situation is likely to be beyond our currently achievable level of control. But the rate of loss, and its projected increase, is well within a sustainable range. At least on a near to mid-term basis.

Longer term, there are Iraqi security forces coming online – not nearly as quickly as Messrs. Bush and Allawi would have us believe, but far more rapidly than Mr. Kerry is claiming. All indications are that the training situation is getting the bugs ironed out, and moving forward smartly. AND, in this matter, we are getting significant international support (ref. The new NATO sponsored training academy). However, it will take time to build the Iraqi security force level up to one which has the upper hand on the situation. Keep in mind though, there is substantial weight to the argument that, with properly directed control measures by existing coalition forces on the guerillas, the rate of increase in guerilla offensive capability will be far outstripped by that of the Iraqi security forces.

In short, there is light at the end of the tunnel.

And it is common for those in the Kerry camp to liken the Iraq campaign to the Vietnam War. There are far too few parallels here to make any plausible claim of equivalence. Most notable among these differences are that, while the NVA/Vietcong axis had a personnel pool of millions to draw upon, without a massive influx of foreign forces, the Iraqi guerillas can draw upon a pool no likely larger than 250,000. And, while Ho Chi Minh strategized upon an acceptable loss ratio of 10 Vietnamese to 1 imperialist fighter, the loss ratio for the Iraqi Saddamist army/guerillas is far worse. Further, while the NVA/Vietcong axis could call upon the virtually unlimited materiel support of their superpower sponsor, the Iraqi guerillas are far more limited in what support they can expect from their foreign sponsors, as this must be transferred quite clandestinely.

But there is one important parallel we must be wary of: the politization of the war. In Vietnam, when we conducted serious, militarily planned operations, most notably Linebacker II, the results were swift and devastating for the North Vietnamese. But then, on the threshold of victory, the politicians stepped in and pulled back on the reins. The enemy regrouped the war continued, and more people died. And so it has been in Fallujah, Najaf, and Sadr City. Our forces have been on the verge of pacifying, and then sanitizing these major terrorist enclaves, only to be withdrawn for misguided political considerations. Such missteps cannot be repeated.

Now, My personal experience and philosophy tells me that, as with the general war on terror, our Iraqi campaign must be conducted far more aggressively than that of the current administration. Were I CIC, I would be instituting far more dramatic redeployment – making more troops available for actual combat theaters, conducting far more vigorous enlistment campaigns, vastly increasing pay and benefits – for not just active duty, but R/NG, and vets as well – and deploying far more troops to Iraq. This would be not simply for force protection and security, but as a buildup for potential invasion of Syria and/or Iran.

But George Bush has taken a markedly less dynamic and cautious course.

But what of John Kerry? Well, it’s harder to pin down his position on this war than that of a Florida hurricane on a weather map. But there is little doubt that, in one regard, he will increase political control over the Iraq campaign. This goes inescapably had-in-had with his professed desire to increase international participation. Does he fantasize that he could even get France to deploy even a single company, without giving up some major amount of control over conduct of the campaign?